1. 'Some members of the London team failed to value positions properly and in good faith, minimized reported and projected losses, and hid from me important information regarding the true risks of the book.
'I did not (and do not) believe I bore personal responsibility for the losses in the synthetic credit book'.
Ina Drew, the JPMorgan executive in charge of the CIO, the unit from which the Whale trades emanated
2. 'If derivatives books can be cooked as blatantly as they are in this case without breaking the rules, then the rules need to be revamped'.
Senator Carl Levin
3. 'The traders seemed to have more responsibility and authority than the higher-up executives'.
Senator John McCain
4. 'I was, and remain, deeply disappointed and saddened to learn of such conduct and the extent to which the London team let me, and the company, down'.
5. 'This whole thing is regrettable and unacceptable. The onus of proof is on us now to demonstrate how this can’t happen in other places, how we weathered the financial crisis well everywhere else, and how we can make the entire firm a safer place to the satisfaction of you, everybody else and our regulators'.
Ashley Bacon, Acting Chief Risk Officer, JPMorgan Chase
6. 'Our findings open a window into the hidden world of high-stakes derivatives trading by big banks. It exposes a derivatives-trading culture at JPMorgan that piled on risk, hid losses, disregarded risk limits, manipulated risk models, dodged oversight and misinformed the public'.
7. 'We got some CRM numbers and they look like garbage as far as I can tell'.
Email from Pete Weiland, former Market-Risk Executive, JPMorgan on being told of the initial losses from the Whale trades.
'Yes, I acknowledge it now, with all the information we have today, that was correct'.
Weiland admitting that his initial response proved to be an error
8. 'I don’t recall the specifics of his reaction'.
Douglas Braunstein, Vice Chairman of JPMorgan Chase on Group CEO Jamie Dimon’s reaction when the CIO resumed the daily profit and loss reports to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. An examiner at the OCC had said Dimon had originally halted them because Dimon 'believed it was too much information'.
9. One regulator wrote in a May 2012 e-mail that the CIO position was a 'make believe voodoo magic ‘composite hedge''. And so it proved to be the case.
image: © brydeb